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IN THE UI AH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appeal No. 20060788-CA
LARRY YAZZIEC; \,
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS
TO r n N W T rr v r»xr CHILD ABUSE
In its Brief ofAppelle.f
support the conviction of reckless child abuse. Brief ofAppellee at p. 9.
in tne instant matter v u was convicted of reckless child abuse, a third-degr ;e felony.
UUU^l

\„

i-ckkss child abuse are as

Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having l lie
care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict seri< us
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: (b> if d< :c
recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree.

For child abuse to have occurred injury must have been inflicted upon the child in this matter;
however, as argued in Cly's opening brief, there is insufficient evidence to show that this
occurred.
"[C]riminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities a nd before
we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as chargedfromwhich the jury may base its conclusion of gui It beyond
a reasonable doubt"); see also State v. George. 25 Utah 2d 330,481 P.2d 667,667 (1971)
(reversing conviction where circumstantial evidence required jury "to indulge an inference
upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture"). Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvan. 1999 UT
App 61110, 975 P.2d 501 (Utah App.,1999.)
"No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes. 2005
UT 33,111,116 P.3d 305, citing InreWinship. 397 U.S. 358,90 S.Ct 1068,25 L.Ed. 368
(U.S.N. Y. 1970). "The Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional
status, linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial." Id., citing Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275. 278,113
S.Ct. 2078,124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 364,90 S.Ct. 1068. This
Court has stated as follows:
The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by those entrusted with
judging the fate ofpersons charged with crimes before we will permit the StE.te
to wield its power to punish is not only a measure of evidence, but also ir. a
more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's conscience. The measure of
2

certainty the law demands before finding guilt reflects the balance we i re
willing to strike between ensuring that all of the guilty are brought to justi ce
and preventing the conviction and punishment of the innocent.
The right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and the United Stales
Constitutions. See State v. Lopes. 1999UT24413,980 P.2d 191 (holdingtl at
"as both a state and federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due proct ss
requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes
beyond a reasonable doubt (citing UTAH CONST, ART. I, §7 which reads: 1 Jo
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of Is w
and U.S. CONST, AMENDS. V,

XIV).

State v. Mora. 2003 UT App 117,1>;>, 69 P.3d 838. (other citations omitted)).
Although Appellant did admit to throwing the knife into the bushes, no evic ence was
presented to show that it

n nil lrni.-iiii.hi

ilinuu^ii irriuimiii iilmnu u

iliy that

he told officers that the knife had hit his foot and had caused a bruise, at trial Fernando
recanted this story insisting that he had lied to the officers because at that time he hi d wanted
hisfatht-M, , I ,,i.l II II'SIIIKMI |i>-<M., .I,.I i.ii u . I anything
but that a rock or stick could have struct

. asheranaway

at pp. 102

No evidence was presented at trial to show that anyone actually saw the kn; fe hitting
I cniamlo I i

In liiniscll CSCM <IM>II il ill ii tin h ni

I ii i imony was presented

that the knife was thrown into the bushes or that Cb luuHhi knife one nmiiinil ml i l n i
gone the next, but no one testified that they saw the knife hit Fernando in the heel c r actually
the knife at Fernando. Even if the knife had been thrown at Fernando, the

extremely unlikely. This is supportive of Cly 's argument that no evidence exist; to show
3

that the knife actually struck Fernando, evidencing that insufficient evidence exists i o support
the reckless child abuse conviction.
In the instant matter, insufficient evidence exists to show that Cly committei I reckless
child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. No one actually saw Cly throw the knife i lirectly at
Fernando or saw the knife actually hit Fernando. Cly testified that he threw the ki ife in the
bushes. Fernando testified that, while he initially told officers that Cly had thrown the knife
at him and it had hit his heel, at trial he recanted this statement and testified that the knife did
not hit him and that he must have been hit by a rock or stick.
Lahoma only testified that she saw the Cly with the knife one moment and that he was
without it the next. No one testified or presented any evidence that Cly was actually seen
throwing the knife at Fernando or that the knife hit Fernando. The alleged incident of the
knife hitting Fernando has been based upon Fernando's recanted statement that he was struck
by the knife. Insufficient evidence has been presented to show that child abuse occurred
beyond a reasonable doubt. Without sufficient evidence to conclude that Cly was guilty of
reckless child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt, his conviction on such a charge cannot be
upheld. If such a conviction were upheld with insufficient evidence to show that it was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Cly 's due process rights would be violated.

Because

evidence has not been presented to show that Cly actually threw the knife at Fernando, or that
the knife actually hit the child, there is no evidence to show that Cly inflicted ir jury upon
the child. Because no evidence has been presented to show that Cly inflicted ir jury upon
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the child., the first element of reckless child abuse has not been met. Without meet ng all the
elements of the offense, it is not possible to sustain a conviction beyond a reasona ble doubt
for reckless child abuse and the conviction should be reversed.
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING A JURY INSTRUCTION WITH
REFERENCE TO APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION THEFEBY
PBECLUDING APPELLANT FROM ASKING FOR A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION
In the Briefof Appellee the State argues that Cly was not entitled to a jury ii struction
regarding voluntary intoxication because voluntary intoxication is not a defense to
aggravated assault Brief of Appellee at p. 15. However, the trial court erred by r ot giving
the jury the voluntary intoxication instruction, foreclosing Cly from requesting a lesser
included offense jury instruction.
ITie Utah Supreme Court has long held the following with respect to a tri.il court's
obligation in charging the jury with a lesser included offense jury instruction:
iVn accused is generally entitled to a jury instruction on lesser included
offenses. However, the court has no obligation to charge the jury with respect
to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a
verdict of acquittal of the offense charged and for a verdict of guilt on an
included offense.
State v.Elliott 641 P.2d 122,123 (Utah 1982). "Trial court has duty to instruct j u y on law
applicable to facts of case such that defendant's theory of case is presented to juiy in clear
and understandable way; however, trial court may refuse to give instruction that misstates
law and it is not error to refuse proposed instruction if point is properly covered in other
instraclions." State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, (Utah,1992). "A criminal defendant is
5

entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the instructions given to the jury, and the
instructions should not incorrectly or misleadingly state the material rules of law." See State
v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Utah 1988); State v. Cox. 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah
App.1988). State v.Alv. 782 P.2d 549, 550, (Utah App. 1989).
In the case of State v. Brown. 694 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme
Court discussed the request of a lesser-included offense jury instruction by the d sfendant,
when it stated as follows:
When it is the defendant who requests the instruction, we held in State v.
Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983) that an evidence-based analysis must be
used in order to afford the accused the full benefit of the reasonable doubt
standard. We determined that two requirements must be met under our
statutory system in order for the defendant to be entitled to an instruction on
a lesser offense. First, the statutory elements of the offenses must be related in
some way; there must be some overlap in the definitions of the two crimes,
even though they need not meet the totally "included" standard. T'lis
comparison of the statutory elements helps in determining whether an offense
is an "included offense" under § 76-1-402(3 )(a), which provides that an
offense is included when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged."
Second, we held that the court must instruct on the lesser offense only if th<;re
is some evidence at trial that, if believed by the jury, would provide a "ratio:* al
basis for a verdict of acquitting the defendant of the offense charged end
convicting him of the included offense," U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(4).
The Utah Supreme Court later undertook further analysis as to the determinat on of the
evidence and its susceptibility to alternative explanations, requiring a lesser included offense
jury instruction in such circumstances as follows:
This Court in State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983) set forth the standards
to be used to determine whether a jury should be instructed on lesser included
offenses. If a defendant requests a lesser included instruction, as was the case
6

here, an evidence-based standard controls. To determine whether an offense
is included in a charged offense, the trial court must first determine whether
the offense is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged. If the same facts
tend to prove elements of more man one statutory offense and the evidence is
ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations, the trial court must gi ve
the lesser included offense instruction if any one of the alternative
interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting tie
defendant ofthe offense charged and convicting him ofthe included offense."
State v, Velarde, 734 P.2d 449,451, (Utah,1986).
A criminal defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction whe re
there is some evidence to support the lesser offense; in addition, "[a] defend* nt
is entitled to have his legal theory of the case placed before the jury if it wot Id
not be superfluous to do so because of an absence of any evidence to support
the theory." Statev.Standiford. 769 P.2d 254,266 (Utah 1988); see also £& Jg
v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). In Harding, we adopted the nJe
stated in State v. Castillo. 23 Utah 2d 70,72-73,457P.2d618,620 (1969), aid
held that the court must give an instruction reflecting the defendant's theory of
trie case unless the evidence in support thereofwas so slight that all reasonable
people would have to conclude against the defendant on that point. 635 P. 2d
a: 34; see also Delaware v. Van ArsdalL 475 U.S. 673,684,106 S.Ct. 1431,
1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah
1989).
StatevPiamiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 871, (Utah, 1998).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-506 states as follows:

Elvery person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, r ot
Li necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or
inlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
The Utedh Supreme Court has previously held §76-10-506 to be a lesser included < fTense of
aggraveted assault in State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah 1984). The Utah
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Supreme Court reversed Oldroyd' s conviction of assault with intent to commit seric us bodily
injury where the trial court denied defendant's request for an instruction on ihe lesser
included offense of "threatening with a dangerous weapon" because the only options before
the jury were to convict of aggravated assault or acquit. See, State v. Daniels. 2C02 UT 2,
f 28,40 P.3d 611. The Utah Supreme Court used the following analysis in its reversal of
Oldroyd:
In the case at hand, there is a rational basis for acquitting Oldroyd of
aggravated assault and convicting him of threatening with a dangerous
weapon. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to
defendant, [footnote omitted] there was evidence presented that showed that t be
gun Oldroyd had was not loaded. The officers all testified that the bullets J or
the gun were in Oldroyd's pocket when he was arrested. Oldroyd himsolf
testified that he had unloaded the gun before approaching his wife's apartme it.
Therefore, that evidence is subject to the alternative interpretation that the g an
was not loaded and was thus not deadly. Further, there was evidence tl at
clearly negated a threat by defendant to do bodily harm: there was no verbal
threat, no direct evidence that the gun was cocked, no bullets in the gun. All
witnesses testified that the stairwell was dark. Oldroyd testified that he did r ot
hear the officers approaching and did not recognize Officer Evans when the
officer suddenly shone the light directly in Oldroyd's face. Oldroyd furtler
testified that he wasfrightenedof being shot himself. Both Oldroyd and Eva ns
testified that Oldroyd, after throwing his gun out, said to "go ahead and she ot
me." Given this evidence, the intent to threaten Evans was clearly in dispu :e.
A jury could reasonably conclude that there was no intention to do bodily
injury to the officer while still believing that Oldroyd drew or exhibited ttie
revolver in an angry and threatening manner.
Oldrovd at 555.
In the instant matter, because Cly was not given the voluntary intoxication jury
instruction he was foreclosedfromrequesting a lesser included jury instruction under UTAH
CODE ANN.

§76-10-506. The voluntary intoxication instruction was necessary to allow the

8

jury to consider the intoxication in a subsequent request for a lesser included offense.
Intoxication would be a key factor in determination of whether a lesser included offense
under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-506 should be given since it requires a showing of lesser
intent, as evidenced by Oldrovd. supra.
In Oldroyd. the Utah Supreme Court reversed on evidence similar to the insfcmt matter
and specifically pertaining to Oldroyd's level of intent regarding the threat by defendant to
do bodily harm, as required under an aggravated assault charge. Cly's level of intDxication
could have evidenced a difference not in the intent level as it pertains to kno *ing and
voluntary versus reckless versus criminal negligence, but in the request for a lesser included
offense jury instruction showing that he did not intend to threaten anyone with bod ly injury.
Similar to Oldroyd, Cly threw out the weapon before causing any harm to anyone, so his
"intent to threaten"could reasonable be in dispute. Similar to Oldroyd, Cly's jury c< >uld have
reasonably concluded, based upon his intoxication, that there was no intention to Jo bodily
injury while still believing that Cly drew or exhibited the knife in an angry and threatening
manner. However, absent the instruction to the jury allowing them to consider Cly's
intoxication, this argument clearly cannot be made.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-306 sets forth as follows:

Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless su :h
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes in
element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offen ;e.

9

Had the jury been advised of the voluntary intoxication instruction and that Cly was
voluntJiry intoxicated at the time of the incident and not in hisrightmind, this would have
shown that he may have been guilty of a lesser included offense under UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-1C -506 and not the aggravated assault. Showing the voluntary intoxication of Cly at the
time of the incident and how that intoxication may have negated his intent to threaten needed
to be presented to the jury to enable Cly to request a lesser included offense to the aggravated
assault. However, Cly was foreclosed from doing so absent the voluntary intoxication
instruction since his lack of culpable mental state respecting the intent to threaten would not
be before them. Therefore, the trial court erred by not giving the jury the voluntary
intoxication instruction because it foreclosed Clyfromrequesting a lesser included offense
instruction.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
MERGE THE CHARGES OF CHILD ABUSE
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF A CHILD
In Brief of Appellee the State attempts to argue that Domestic Violence in the Presence
of a Child is not a lesser included offense of Child Abuse and therefore, the two charges
cannot be merged. Brief of Appellee at p. 18.
As this Court observed, in its origin," f[m]erger is a judicially-crafted doctrine
available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for
committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal statute.1" Stete
v. Smith. 2005 UT 57, If 7,122 P.3d 615, citing State v. Smith. 2003 UT App
52, f 19,65 P.3d 648 (quoting State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288, f 17,55 P.3d
1131). The motivating principle behind the merger doctrine is to prevent
violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. Id citing State v.
Lopez. 2004 UT App 410, f 8, 103 P.3d 153 ("Courts apply the merger
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doctrine as one means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy thai a
defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime."); see also Brown
v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ("[T]iie
[Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive prosecution and cumulative
punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."). Codifying this
doctrine, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3) sets forth as follows:
defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
See also, State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the- test for
determining whether a conviction for two separate offenses violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause is essentially the same as that in UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1 -402(3)); State v.ftlcCovev.
803 P.2d 1234,1235 (Utah 1990)(recognizing that convictions for both a greater ar d a lesser
included offense would violate both the Double Jeopardy Clause and UTAH CODE J LNN. §761-402(3)). "[W]here the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot be committe i without
necessarily having committed the lesser,1 then as a matter of law they stand in the rel ationship
of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot be convicted or punished lor both."
Smith atf 8 citing Statev.HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Biker. 671
P.2d 152,156 (Utah 1983)).
The question of merger arises when "[t]wo statutes or two portions of a single
statute proscribe certain conduct, and the question is whether the defendant c m
be punished twice because his conduct violates both proscriptions." Gore. v.
United States. 357 U.S. 386, 393-94, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (19.S8)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). For example, as part of the crime, a raj ist
11

necessarily physically detains the victim. This crime comprises activity that
could be charged as both kidnapping and rape. See id; State v. Couch. 635
P.2d 89,93 (Utah 1981). When the conduct comprising one charge is "slight,
inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other crime," a court should ri Je
[hat the charges merge together for punishment purposes. State v. Finlavscn.
2000 UT 10 at % 23, 994 P.2d 1243 (quotations and citation omitted). Whsn
charges merge, "[i]t is not the case that the defendant is not guilty of the lesser
offense; it is rather the case that he is guilty of those lesser offenses but simply
is not to be twice punished." White v. Maryland 100 Md.App. 1, 639 A.2d
194, 199(Ct.Spec.App.l994).
State v. Lopez. 2004 UT App 410. f 4.103 P.3d 153. In State v. Lee. 2006 UT 5 4 31.128
P.3d 1 .79, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
"[w]e recognized that, in some factual scenarios, crimes may be so related that
they must merge even though neither is a lesser included offense of the other
under section 76-1-402. Where two crimes are defined narrowly enough that
proof of one does not constitute proof of the other, but broadly enough that
both may arisefromthe same facts, merger may be appropriate. Otherwise, a
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts to or ly
one offense, a result contrary to protections against double jeopardy in general,
see State v.Harris. 2004 UT 103, f 22,104 P.3d 1250, and the merger doctrine
in particular, see State v. Lopez. 2004UT App410,18,103 P.3d 153 ("Courts
apply the merger doctrine as one means of alleviating the concern of double
jeopardy that a defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime/').
In the instant matter the charges of Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in the
Presence of a Child should have been merged. The State attempts to argue that, because the
victims in the statutes are different and a child witness must exist in order to charge: a person
with domestic violence in the presence of a child, the statutes are different enough that they
cannot be subjected to merger. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. The State further argues that each
of the charges could be committed without committing the other. Id. The State s narrow
sighted in this argument.

19

The first element under the statute for committing Domestic Violence in the Presence
of a Child is child abuse, therefore, this element must be met in order for a person to be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge of Domestic Violence in the Presence
of a Child. Should this Court determine to overturn the findings respecting the incident
pertaining to the knife being thrown in the bushes as argued under Cly's opening brief and
in Argument I herein, but determine that the alleged emotional abuse suffered by the child
in witnessing the alleged domestic violence incident is sufficient to uphold a separate and
distinct charge of child abuse, Cly submits that such a charge must be mergec into the
Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child charge. The two cannot be separately
convicted in this instance.
If a child witnesses a domestic violence incident between its parents or careg i vers, the
child is susceptible to suffering emotional abuse, which can be construed as child abuse.
However, this type of "child abuse" is included as an element of the charge of domestic
Violence in the Presence of a Child and should thus be merged with such a charge. ITie State
is thus narrowly sighted in arguing that these two charges can never be merged. A charge
of Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child as occurred in thi; instance
violates the double jeopardy clause under the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, UTAH CONST. ART. I § 12. Hence, should i his Court
overturn thefindingsunder Cly's sufficiency of the evidence challenge argued herein, any
remaining elements of "child abuse" must then be merged into the Domestic Violence in the
Presence of a Child charge to protect his constitutional rights heretofore indicate!
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully request, that this
Court inverse the trial court's Judgment, and enter such other andfartherrelief it deems
neeessuty.
DATED THIS 3rd day of April, 2007.
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